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Abstract
We study electoral competition among politicians who are hetero-
geneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what
they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from
being in office. We show that politicians’ incentives to behave op-
portunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of
policy preferences. Moreover, politicians may have stronger incen-
tives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely
to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-
reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. Lastly, we show that
the mere probability that politicians care about the public interest
enables opportunistic politicians to damage the reputation of their
competitors. Consequently, efficient policies may be reversed.
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1 Introduction
When politicians talk about their motives for pursuing a political career,
they rarely mention their narrow private interests such as desire for power,
prestige, and remuneration. Instead, they refer to their devotion to the
people, their commitment to the nation’s interests, and a strong sense of
mission and responsibility. History has learned that we should not always
take these words for granted. Indeed, sceptics claim that politicians care
about nothing but their narrow self-interest.
The importance of politicians’ motivation for the quality of government
decision making is self-evident. Since moral hazard and adverse selection
problems in political decision making abound, politicians’ motivation mat-
ters for policy choices. This is also clear from the literature on electoral
competition: in many settings, policy choices depend on whether politicians
care about the private rents from office (opportunism) or represent the inter-
est of a particular group of voters (partisanship), see Persson and Tabellini
(2000). Wittman (1983), Rogoff (1990), and Harrington (1993), among oth-
ers, develop models where politicians care about both policy outcomes and
holding office. Then, policy choices depend on how much politicians value
policy relative to office. Empirical studies indicate that politicians are neither
purely policy-oriented nor purely office-motivated, see Martin and Stevenson
(2001)’s findings for European countries and Canada and those by Diermeier,
Keane, and Merlo (2002) for the US.
The objective of this paper is to examine how politicians with heteroge-
neous motivations interact in electoral competition. We examine how beliefs
about other politicians’ motivation and behavior affect the incentive to be-
have opportunistically of a politician with a given motivation. We show
that opportunistic behavior may breed opportunistic behavior. A political
culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise.
We also examine whether politicians who care a lot about the public inter-
est may undo opportunistic actions by politicians who care little about the
public interest. While this may be the case, the reverse may also be true:
opportunistic politicians may oppose efficient policies so as to damage the
reputation of their competitors in the elections.
Compared to the existing literature, our model has two important distin-
guishing features. First, we allow for heterogeneity in politicians’ motivation
as well as in politicians’ competence. We define a politician’s motivation
as the extent to which he cares about (what he perceives as) the public in-
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terest relative to the private rents from being in office. We assume that a
politician’s motivation, as well as his competence, are not observable. Voters
and other politicians are informed, though, about the distribution of types
from which politicians are drawn. Second, we consider a setting where, in
each period, multiple politicians are involved in policy making and, hence,
may face a trade-off between the public interest and their electoral prospects.
More specifically, we develop a model with three political parties of which
two form a coalition government. In each period, there are two politicians in
office, each being responsible for a particular policy area. Together, these two
features of the model (heterogeneity in motivation and multiple politicians
with decision-making power) imply that a politician’s behavior is not only
dependent on his own motivation, but also on ‘political culture,’ that is, his
beliefs about other politicians’ motivation and behavior.
We consider a two-period model with elections at the end of the first
period. We assume that each incumbent leader, before the elections, ac-
quires an informational advantage over voters concerning the quality of the
policies he has implemented. When a policy turned out to be a failure, re-
versing the policy before the next elections is in the best interest of voters.
However, reversing a policy entails a reputational loss for the incumbent as
voters update their belief about the incumbent’s competence in designing
good policies. Therefore, politicians who care little about the public interest
have an incentive to stick to their policies so as to avoid erosion of their
electoral prospects. Only those politicians who care sufficiently about the
public interest are willing to admit a policy failure at the risk of losing the
next election.1
Our analysis yields three main results. First, we show that politicians
are less inclined to admit that a policy has failed when politicians’ pay is
higher. As holding office becomes more rewarding, a larger range of politi-
cians are willing to compromise on voters’ welfare so as to increase their
chance of reelection. Likewise, politicians’ incentive to behave opportunis-
tically is stronger in more polarized political environments, that is, in en-
vironments where politicians differ more in their perception of the public
interest. The reason is that in more polarized political environments, staying
1By our two-period structure, voters optimally base their vote only on their beliefs
about the politicians’ competence, not about politicians’ motivation. If politicians can
stay in office for more than two periods, this need not hold. Then, opportunistic politicians
may have an incentive to pretend a policy failure, so as to improve upon their reputation
as a motivated politician.
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in office is more rewarding as it keeps politicians with sharply different policy
preferences out of power.
Second, we show that politicians have stronger incentives to behave op-
portunistically if they believe other politicians are more likely to behave
opportunistically. The reason is that a given reputational loss has less of
an effect on a politician’s electoral prospects in an environment where other
politicians are more likely to put at risk their reputation as well, than in
an environment where politicians hardly ever admit policy failures. Con-
sequently, a political culture may be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria
may arise. Moreover, the effects of higher politicians’ pay and polarization
on politicians’ behavior are magnified by the strategic complementarity in
politicians’ opportunism.
Third, we show that opportunistic politicians may engage in reputation-
bashing activities, implying that efficient policies may be reversed. When
politicians have the opportunity to collect information about the effects of
policies, politicians who care sufficiently about the public interest collect in-
formation about all policies that have been implemented, including those by
other politicians, and make sure that inefficient policies are reversed. Politi-
cians who care little about the public interest do not search for information.
However, the fact that highly motivated politicians do, lends some credibility
to a politician’s claim that his competitor’s policy is a failure. As a result,
efficient policies may be reversed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview
of earlier work and discusses how this paper relates to it. Section 3 presents
the model. In Section 4, we solve the model and provide the comparative
static results. Section 5 extends the model to allow for information collection
by politicians. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Building on the seminal works by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) on moral
hazard in politics and by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) on ad-
verse selection in politics, several recent papers have studied electoral com-
petition when politicians are heterogeneous in motivation. In contrast to
the present study, almost all of the existing papers consider heterogeneity
3
in politicians’ willingness to accept bribes or to steal tax revenues.2 Early
papers include Besley and Case (1995), who study the role of yardstick com-
petition in disciplining ‘bad’ policy makers, and Coate and Morris (1995),
who show that ‘bad’ politicians may use inefficient ‘sneaky’ methods of redis-
tribution towards special interests rather than cash payments, so as to avoid
reputational damage. Recently, several papers have built on these contribu-
tions to examine the role of politicians’ pay, term limits, and other features
of the political process in disciplining and selecting politicians. An important
element in these models is the assumption that is made about the information
that voters have when they cast their ballot.
When voters can observe or infer bribe-taking by office-holders, they will
punish politicians who have accepted bribes by voting them out of office.
Paying politicians generously may then reduce politicians’ incentive to take
bribes as losing office becomes more costly (Besley, 2003).3 Paying high
wages, however, may impair the selection of politicians since bad politicians,
by their good behavior, are reelected more often. This is important if politi-
cians face no reelection constraint in a future period, for instance because of
a term limit (Besley and Smart, 2003). High politicians’ pay also adversely
affects selection in our model, but the effect arises from politicians behav-
ing worse rather than better in their first period when pay is higher. In our
model, higher politicians’ pay weakens politicians’ incentive to admit a policy
failure, which impairs voters’ selection of competent politicians.
When voters can not infer whether an incumbent has accepted bribes,
but they can observe the incumbent’s policy choices, high politicians’ pay
may distort policy choices by ‘good’ politicians (that is, those who do not
accept bribes). This may happen when some policy choices may be in the
voters’ interest but at the same time raise suspicion about the incumbent’s
integrity (Smart and Sturm, 2003). Our result on politicians’ pay depends on
2An exception is a recent paper by Callander (2004) who shows that politicians may
be unwilling to commit to the median voter’s position in the campaign stage, as this may
be a bad signal about their motivation to perform well in office. Roemer (1999) studies
electoral competition between political parties in proposing progressive income tax policies,
assuming that each party consists of factions with different motivations which must reach
agreement on the proposal.
3Relatedly, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2003) consider a model where honest politicians
are threathened by ‘nasty’ interest groups. Increasing the rents from office may increase
politicians’ resistance against those pressures. These results relate to Becker and Stigler
(1974) who argue that paying high wages to bureaucrats may help to fight corruption if
the probability that corruption is discovered is strictly positive but smaller than one.
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a similar information asymmetry between incumbents and voters about the
efficacy of policies, but relies on politicians’ concern about their reputation
as a competent policy maker. Whereas in Smart and Sturm (2003) ‘good’
politicians compromise on voters’ welfare so as to avoid being considered
corrupt, in our paper politicians refuse to admit a policy failure so as to
preserve their reputation as a competent policy maker.
Other papers have focused on citizen’s incentives to run for office, building
on the citizen-candidate model developed by Osborne and Slivinsky (1996)
and Besley and Coate (1997). Caselli and Morelli (2004) show that incompe-
tent and dishonest citizens have strongest incentive to pursue elective office.
Incompetent citizens gain more from holding office as their market wage is
lower (see also Messner and Polborn, 2003). Dishonest citizens gain more as
office-holding enables them to collect bribes (see also Besley, 2003). Com-
petent and honest citizens will only run for office when the reward is suffi-
ciently high compared to their outside option.4 Le Borgne and Lockwood
(2002) endogenize candidate entry decisions in a Rogoff (1990)-style model
and examine the implications for political budget cycles. In our paper, we
abstract from the entry decision and, instead, focus on how heterogeneity in
politicians’ motivation among an existing pool of politicians affects politi-
cians’ incentives and their response to changes in politicians’ pay and other
features of the political process.
An important feature of our model is that we have more than one politi-
cian in each period who may face a trade-off between the public interest and
electoral prospects. This feature is responsible for two of our three main
results, namely that there is a strategic complementarity in politicians’ op-
portunism, and that opportunistic politicians may oppose efficient policies so
as to damage the reputation of competing politicians. Our result on strategic
complementarity in politicians’ opportunistic actions relates to (but is differ-
ent from) studies showing strategic complementarity in accepting bribes and
in rent-seeking, see e.g. Andvig and Moene (1990), Murphy et al. (1991),
and Tirole (1996). Aidt (2003, Section 4) provides a survey of studies in this
area. As Hillman and Swank (2000) note, political culture has not been a
focus of attention for economists so far. Our result on reputation bashing
by opportunistic politicians is related to models of promotion tournaments
4Poutvaara and Takalo (2002) show that if campaigning produces a noisy signal of
the ability of candidates, then increasing the compensation of elected officials may either
increase or decrease the average candidate quality, depending on campaigning costs.
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where contestants can engage in sabotage activities, see in particular Lazear
(1989), and to papers on negative campaigning, see Skaperdas and Grofman
(1995) and Konrad (2004).
Caillaud and Tirole (2002) study intra- and interparty competition be-
tween candidates who have the option to invest in designing a good policy
platform. They show that interparty competition may give rise to strate-
gic substitutability in platform investment, whereas intraparty competition
may give rise to strategic complementarity. An opportunity to let party’s
candidates share the rents from office may help to induce a candidate who
designed a low-quality platform to stand down and to refrain from challeng-
ing the party’s other candidate’s good platform. We abstract from intraparty
competition and exclusively focus on interparty competition. As in Caillaud
and Tirole (2002), we do not allow for rent-sharing between candidates from
different parties. An important difference between their paper and our pa-
per is that politicians are purely office-motivated and homogeneous in their
paper, whereas in our paper politicians care about both the public inter-
est and office-holding, and are heterogeneous in competence and motivation.
The heterogeneity of politicians gives rise to an adverse selection problem in
addition to a moral hazard problem.
Our model builds on Dur (2001) who shows that policy makers may stick
to inefficient policies for reputational reasons.5 Compared to that paper,
there are two main innovations. First, in this paper politicians differ not
only in competence but also in their motivation and in their policy prefer-
ences. Second, we consider a multi-party system with coalition governments
instead of a two-party system. Our model of coalition governments is deliber-
ately kept simple so as to focus on the effects of heterogeneity in politicians’
motivation. Richer models of coalition governments and elections include
Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Laver and Shepsle (1990), and Baron and
Diermeier (2001).
5Relatedly, in Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), Chiu (2002), and Maskin and
Tirole (2002), politicians who care a lot about reelection may have a reputational incentive
to implement inefficient policies which are popular among the electorate and reject effi-
cient policies which are unpopular. Majumdar and Mukand (2004) and Slantchev (2003)
consider a similar agency problem as we do and extend it in other directions.
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3 The Model
Consider a three party system. Each party I consists of a single leader i,
where i ∈ {l,m, r}. There are two periods. In each period none of the
parties constitutes a majority. We assume that in period 1 party L and M
form a coalition government. Each leader i in office designs and implements
one policy yi.6 Hence, policies yl and ym are implemented in period 1. To
save space, we assume that policies last for only one period. Assuming that
policies designed in period 1 may yield benefits or costs in period 2 as well
does not affect our results qualitatively.
A policy is either good or bad, which is unknown before implementation.
The expected quality of a policy depends on the competence of the leader
who designed it. A leader is either competent or incompetent. A competent
(incompetent) leader designs a good policy with probability p (q), where
1 ≥ p > q ≥ 0. Neither voters nor the leader himself know whether he is
competent.7 The prior belief that a leader is competent is denoted by α,
which is equal for all three leaders. To facilitate the presentation, denote
by x the prior probability that a leader designs a good policy, where x =
[αp+ (1− α)q].
Leaders have different perceptions of the public interest: they value good
policies designed by themselves more than good policies designed by others.
More specifically, according to leader i, a good policy yi raises social welfare
with bii, whereas a good policy yj raises social welfare with b
j
i , where j 6= i ∈
{l,m, r} and bii > bji > 0. Note that a leader cares equally about good
policies designed by the two other leaders (e.g., blr = b
m
r ). This implies that a
leader’s policy preferences do not affect his chances to be part of a coalition
government in period 2.8 A bad policy decreases social welfare with cost
6We abstract from leader’s option not to implement a policy in period 1. Majumdar and
Mukand (2004) have recently shown that reputational concerns may induce incumbents
to be too conservative or too radical in policy implementation. See also Biglaiser and
Mezzetti (1997), Glazer (2002), and Suurmond, Swank, and Visser (2004).
7Assuming that each leader knows his own ability does not affect the results qualita-
tively. A leader who knows that he is competent has a weaker incentive to reverse a bad
policy than an incompetent leader since a competent leader faces a higher probability to
design a good policy in period 2, making reelection more valuable.
8Relaxing this assumption may imply that a centrist party’s leader has less of an
incentive to behave opportunistically as, because of her policy preferences, she is much
more certain to be in office again next period. A centrist party’s internal control mechanism
may be weaker, however, see Caillaud and Tirole (1999).
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c, irrespective of which leader designed the bad policy. This cost c can be
avoided by reversing the bad policy which, however, comes at a cost d. We
assume that c > d > 0 such that reversing a bad policy is in the public
interest.
Besides ideological differences, politicians also differ in their motivation.
The utility function of leader i is:
Ui = βi (V1i + V2i) + (e1 + e2)X,
where Vti are the consequences of government policies for social welfare in
period t as perceived by leader i, et is one if leader i is in office in period t and
zero otherwise, X is the private rents from being in office in a period (which
includes politicians’ pay, perks, fame, and so on), and βi measures how much
leader i cares about (what he perceives as) the public interest relative to the
private rents from office-holding.9 We assume that a politician’s motivation
βi is private knowledge. However, leaders as well as voters know that βi
is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, β¯]. We study the
implications of non-uniform distributions in Section 4.3.
After implementing yi, leader i receives a signal which reveals the quality
of yi. Voters do not observe the content of the signal.10 Furthermore, a
leader can not credibly transmit the content of his signal to other leaders
or to voters. In Section 5, we extend the analysis by giving leaders the
opportunity to evaluate each other’s policy.
After the signals have been received, the three leaders decide on the con-
tinuation of each policy through majority voting. The vote on yl and the
vote on ym take place simultaneously. Citizens observe the leaders’ votes.11
Accordingly, voters update their beliefs about the competence of leader l and
9An interesting extension is to allow for heterogeneity in X among politicians as well.
This heterogeneity may stem from differences in tastes but also from differences in politi-
cians’ outside options. Professional politicians may have a particularly bad outside option
compared to politicians who entered politics after a career elsewhere. Therefore, pro-
fessional politicians may be most tempted to behave opportunistically and may be least
trusted by voters. We leave this topic for future research.
10We consider an extreme case where a politician becomes completely informed whereas
voters remain completely uninformed about the consequences of government policies. Re-
sults are qualitatively unaffected, though, when voters receive a noisy signal about the
quality of policies, e.g. through the media. Crucial is that politicians are better informed
than voters.
11We feel this is a plausible assumption as, usually, a Minister who admits that his
policy is a failure makes headlines.
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m using Bayes’ rule. The voters’ posterior belief about the competence of
leader i is denoted by αˆv, where superscript v ∈ {c, r} refers to leader i’s
vote to continue (c) or reverse (r) his policy. As leaders may act oppor-
tunistically, the posterior beliefs of voters and leaders need not coincide. We
denote by αˆp leader i’s posterior belief about his own competence, where
superscript p ∈ {g, b} refers to the quality of the policy, good (g) or bad
(b). For future reference, we denote by xˆv = [αˆvp+ (1− αˆv)q] the voters’
posterior belief about the probability that leader i designs a good policy if in
office in period 2, given his voting decision in period 1. Similarly, we define
xˆp = [αˆpp+ (1− αˆp)q].
At the end of period 1 elections take place. We distinguish four groups
of voters. Three equally-sized groups of voters are ‘loyalists,’ each attached
to a different party. Loyalists have strong partisan preferences such that
they always vote for their party’s leader, irrespective of their belief about
the competence of the leader.12 A fourth group of voters, the swing voters,
derive benefits from a good policy irrespective of which of the three leaders
designed the policy, bi = bj. As each group of loyalists is of equal size, swing
voters determine the winner of the elections (that is, the leader with the
highest number of votes).
After the elections, two parties form a coalition government.13 We assume
that the winner of the elections has the right to form a government. As in
period 1, the two coalition parties in period 2 both implement a policy. Next,
signals are received and decisions are made on the continuation of the two
new policies through majority voting.
Summarizing, the sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nature chooses ability and motivation of the leaders.
2. In period 1, leader l (m) designs and implements policy yl (ym).
12Formally, this requires that xˆrbii−(1−xˆr)d > xˆcb
j
i−(1−xˆc)d for a loyal voter attached
to party I. For sufficiently high values of bii/b
j
i (sufficient polarization) this condition is
satisfied.
13A two-party coalition government requires that the group of swing voters is smaller
than 25% of the whole population. If the group of swing voters is larger, then the winner
of the elections constitutes a majority. Further, we assume that any two parties prefer
a minimum winning coalition over a grand coalition consisting of all three parties. This
requires that xbji−(1−x)d < 0. Otherwise, electoral competition disappears. A three-party
coalition government is more likely to arise in period 1 as this may create an opportunity
to learn the opposition party leader’s competence. We abstract from this.
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3. Leader l (m) receives a private signal revealing the quality of yl (ym).
4. The three leaders vote simultaneously on the continuation of yl and of
ym.
5. Leaders and voters observe each leader’s votes and update their beliefs
about the competence of leader l and m.
6. Elections take place.
7. The winner of the elections chooses a coalition party.
8. Incumbent leaders in period 2 design and implement one new policy.
9. Incumbents receive a private signal about the quality of their policies.
10. There is a simultaneous vote on the continuation of the policies.
11. The world ends.
A list of notation is provided at the end of the paper.
4 Equilibrium Political Culture
4.1 Equilibrium
In this section, we solve the model as presented in Section 3 for a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, we identify conditions under which neither
player has an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy, given the
equilibrium strategies and beliefs of the other players. We assume through-
out that if, given the strategies of the other players, a player is indifferent,
he votes as if he is pivotal. This assumption rules out equilibria where play-
ers’ actions are never affected by information.14 Players update their beliefs
about leaders’ competence according to Bayes’ rule. The model is solved by
backward induction.
14For instance, there exists an equilibrium in which all leaders always vote against all
policies, including their own. Similarly, since in the equilibria that we study none of the
swing voters is pivotal, randomizing between the three leaders may be an equilibrium
strategy for each swing voter.
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Period 2 Two parties are in office in period 2, say party I and J . Leader
i designs and implements yi while leader j designs and implements yj. After
implementation, leader i (j) receives a fully informative and private signal
revealing the quality of yi (yj). After the signals have been received, a decision
is made on continuation of each policy by majority voting rule. Denote by Yi
(Yj) a vote of a leader in favor of yi (yj) and by Ni (Nj) a vote against yi (yj).
The following proposition describes a set of equilibrium voting strategies of
the three leaders in period 2.
Proposition 1 Consider the vote on yi and on yj in period 2. Suppose the
opposition leader votes (Ni, Nj). Then leader i votes (Yi, Yj) if yi is good
and (Ni, Yj) if yi is bad. Similarly, leader j votes (Yi, Yj) if yj is good and
(Yi, Nj) if yj is bad.
The strategies described in Proposition 1 imply that good policies are
continued and bad policies are reversed in period 2. The intuition is simple.
First note that electoral concerns do not play a role in period 2 as the world
ends afterwards. As a consequence, each leader’s objective is to maximize
(what he perceives as) the public interest. In spite of the ideological differ-
ences, all three leaders prefer good policies to be continued, as bii > b
j
i > −d,
and bad policies to be reversed, as c > d. However, only the designer of
a policy receives a signal revealing the policy’s quality. Therefore, it is in
everybody’s interest that each incumbent is pivotal in the vote on the con-
tinuation of his own policy. Given that the opposition leader votes against
both policies, leader i then optimally votes in favor of yj and leader j votes
in favor of yi. Leader i and j vote in favor of their own policy only when it
is good.15
Elections and government formation Recall that swing voters deter-
mine the winner of the elections. Swing voters value good policies designed
by the three leaders equally, bi = bj. Since politicians do not behave oppor-
tunistically in period 2, swing voters vote for the leader they believe is most
likely to be competent in designing policies in period 2. As leader r did not
15Note that there exist different sets of equilibrium voting strategies, all yielding the
same outcome. Suppose, for instance, that leader i always votes against yj and leader
j always votes against yi. Then, the opposition party optimally votes in favor of both
policies. Throughout the paper, we focus on equilibria where the opposition party votes
against all government policies.
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design a policy in period 1, voters’ belief that leader r is competent remains
α. Voters’ posterior beliefs about the competence of leader l and m depend
on the decisions made in period 1. Suppose, as in period 2, that a leader is
decisive in the vote on continuation of his policy. We derive the condition
under which this is the case in Lemma 1, see below. Voters know that leader
l (m) is informed about the quality of yl (ym). Therefore, voters’ posterior
belief about the competence of leader l (m) depends on his vote to continue
or reverse yl (ym).
Given that policies are either good or bad, leader l and m can follow
two possible voting strategies regarding their own policy.16 They can vote in
favor of their own policy irrespective of the quality. We call this strategy the
dishonest voting strategy. They can also vote in favor of their own policy
if and only if it turned out to be a good policy. We call this strategy the
honest voting strategy. Voters do not know which strategy the leader follows.
As we will see below, whether a leader selects the dishonest or the honest
strategy depends on how much he cares about the public interest relative to
the private rents from office-holding, which is measured by β. Define w as
the probability that a leader selects the dishonest voting strategy. We derive
the equilibrium value of w later on, see equation (8).
If leader i votes for continuation of his policy yi, then voters update their
belief about the competence of leader i to:
αˆc =
·
αp+ α(1− p)w
αp+ α(1− p)w + (1− α)q + (1− α)(1− q)w
¸
> α for any w < 1.
(1)
When yi is continued, either leader i played the honest voting strategy and yi
is a good policy, or leader i pursued the dishonest voting strategy. Note that
given that there is a probability that a leader pursues the honest strategy
(w < 1), continuation improves the leader’s reputation of being a competent
policy maker. When the probability that leaders play the dishonest strategy
is higher, the reputational gains from continuing a policy are lower. In the
extreme case in which all leaders are expected to act dishonestly in case of a
policy failure, w = 1, continuation does not affect a leader’s reputation, αˆc =
α. When yi is good, leader i updates the belief about his own competence
16Voting against a good policy designed by oneself is never optimal, as will be shown
below, see condition (3).
12
to:
αˆg =
·
αp
αp+ (1− α)q
¸
> αˆc for any w > 0.
Voters’ and leader’s posterior beliefs only coincide when all politicians are
expected to play the honest voting strategy, w = 0.
If leader i votes for reversing his policy yi, then voters’ posterior belief
about the competence of leader i is:
αˆr =
·
α(1− p)
α(1− p) + (1− α)(1− q)
¸
< α. (2)
Voters know that a leader votes for reversing his policy if and only if the
policy turned out to be bad. Reversing a policy therefore always decreases
the probability that voters assign to leader i being competent. Note that,
when a policy is reversed, voters’ and leader’s posterior beliefs always coincide
(αˆr = αˆb).
Equations (1) and (2) imply that, for any w < 1, voters believe that leader
i designs a good policy in period 2 with higher probability if leader i voted
for yi in period 1, and with lower probability if he voted against yi in period
1; xˆc > x > xˆr. Hence, if yl (ym) is continued and ym (yl) is reversed, then
swing voters vote for leader l (m). If both yl and ym are continued, swing
voters are indifferent between leader l and m, but prefer both of them to
leader r. We assume that, in that case, with equal probability either leader l
or leader m wins the elections.17 Leader r wins the elections if both policies
implemented in period 1 are reversed, since x > xˆr.
After the elections, the winner forms a new coalition government. Recall
that a two-party government is preferred to a three-party government by
any coalition party. Since the winner does not prefer one party’s policy over
the other’s for ideological reasons, he chooses the party with the leader he
believes is most likely to be competent. This way, the winner maximizes the
probability of obtaining benefit bji and minimizes the probability of incurring
the cost d. Hence, the coalition party that is most likely to be competent
is selected. As a consequence, a leader i who continues yi is certain to be
17When w = 1, policies are always continued in period 1 and the posterior probability
equals the prior probability αˆc = α, see (1). Hence, voters are indifferent between the
opposition leader and the incumbents. To save space, we assume that, in that case, an
incumbent wins the elections, and both incumbents remain in office. A reason for this
could be that leader r’s prior probability of being competent is slightly lower than α,
which may also motivate why leaders l and m are in office in period 1.
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reelected: Either he wins the elections or he is selected by leader j when
leader j won the elections, since xˆc > x.18 Note that the winner of the
elections has the same beliefs about the other leaders’ competence as voters.
This will be different in Section 5 where leaders can collect information about
the effects of each other’s policies.
Period 1 In period 1 policies yl and ym are implemented. After implemen-
tation, leader l receives a signal revealing the quality of yl whereas leader
m receives a signal revealing the quality of ym. Through majority voting, a
decision is made on continuation of each policy. Since leaders are uniformed
about the quality of each other’s policy, leader i’s vote on leader j’s pol-
icy does not affect voters’ beliefs about leader i’s or leader j’s competence.
Hence, leaders base their vote on each other’s policy only on the expected
effects on the public interest, as in period 2. Lemma 1 shows under which
condition coalition parties vote in favor of each other’s policies in period 1.
Lemma 1 Consider the vote on yl and on ym in period 1. Suppose that
leader r votes (Nl, Nm). Then, leader l votes Ym and leader m votes Yl if
x(bji + d)− (1− x)w(c− d) ≥ 0.
When a policy, although designed by the other leader, is good, support-
ing the policy increases leader i’s utility from policies with bji + d. However,
supporting the other’s policy also gives an opportunistic leader j the oppor-
tunity to continue a bad policy, resulting in net cost c−d. When w increases,
the condition in Lemma 1 becomes more restrictive. When politicians have
little trust in one another (a high level of w), the expected benefits from a
policy designed by an other leader may be negative, as policies are unlikely
to be reversed when they turn out to be bad. Then, a complete political
deadlock may result. When policies lack political support after implemen-
tation, neither leader has an incentive to design and implement a policy as
it will only bring cost d. We restrict our analysis to cases where Lemma 1
holds. Leader l (m) then is decisive in the vote on continuation of yl (ym).
Consider the voting decision of leader l on yl. The voting decision of
leader m on ym is analogous. Suppose leader l receives a signal that yl is a
18Assuming that the prior belief about the competence of the opposition leader is drawn
from a distribution makes the impact of policy continuation on reelection chances more
smooth. Then a leader faces a higher probability of reelection if he continues his policy,
as in Dur (2001).
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good policy. Leader l updates his belief about his competence to αˆg, implying
a probability xˆg to design a good policy in the next period. Leader l decides
to vote in favor of yl if:
βl
½
bll + [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆgbll + xˆ
cbml − (1− xˆg)d− (1− xˆc)d
¤
+(1− x)(1− w)
£
xˆgbll + xb
r
l − (1− xˆg)d− (1− x)d
¤ ¾+X ≥
βl
½
−d+ [x+ (1− x)w] [xˆcbml + xbrl − (1− xˆc)d− (1− x)d]
+(1− x)(1− w)
£
1
2
xˆgbll +
1
2
xˆrbml + xb
r
l − (1− x)d− (1− 12 xˆg −
1
2
xˆr)d
¤ ¾
+
1
2
(1− x)(1− w)X,
which reduces to:
βl
½
bll + d+ [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆgbll − xbrl + (xˆg − x)d
¤
+(1− x)(1− w)1
2
£
xˆgbll − xˆrbml + (xˆg − xˆr) d
¤ ¾
+
·
1− 1
2
(1− x)(1− w)
¸
X ≥ 0. (3)
Condition (3) always holds. Voting in favor of a good policy is beneficial for
three reasons. First, the utility from policies in period 1 increases as voting
in favor of yl provides the benefits bll and prevents the cost of reversing d.
Second, expected utility from policies in period 2 also increases. Voting in
favor of yl ensures that leader l is in office in period 2. As he is as least as
likely as any other leader to design a good policy in period 2, xˆg > x > xˆr,
and since he values his own policies more than those designed by others
(bll > b
m
l = b
r
l ), voting in favor of yl always increases his expected utility from
policies in period 2. Third, continuing yl ensures that leader l receives the
private rents from office, X, in period 2.
Suppose leader l receives a signal that yl is bad. Leader l updates his
belief about his competence to αˆb, implying a probability xˆb = xˆr to design
a good policy in the next period. Leader l votes against yl if:
βl
½
−d+ [x+ (1− x)w] [xbrl + xˆcbml − (1− x)d− (1− xˆc)d]
+(1− x)(1− w)
£
xbrl +
1
2
xˆrbml +
1
2
xˆrbll − (1− x)d− (1− xˆr)d
¤ ¾
+
1
2
(1− x)(1− w)X ≥
βl
½
−c+ [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆrbll + xˆ
cbml − (1− xˆr)d− (1− xˆc)d
¤
+(1− x)(1− w)
£
xbrl + xˆ
rbll − (1− x)d− (1− xˆr)d
¤ ¾+X,
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which reduces to:
βl
½
(c− d)− [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆrbll − xbrl − (x− xˆr)d
¤
− (1− x)(1− w)1
2
xˆr(bll − bml )
¾
−
·
1− 1
2
(1− x)(1− w)
¸
X ≥ 0. (4)
In contrast to condition (3), condition (4) does not always hold. Let us
discuss condition (4) in detail.
First, reversing yl increases utility in period 1 as the cost of continuing a
bad policy are higher than the cost of reversing the policy (c > d), see the
first term in (4).
Second, reversing yl decreases leader l’s probability of reelection and,
therefore, the policies implemented in period 2. The decrease in leader
l’s reelection chances depend on the vote of leader m. With probability
[x+ (1− x)w] leader m votes in favor of ym. Reversing yl then implies that
party R and M are in office in period 2 rather than party L and M . This
has two effects on leader l’s utility from policies in period 2. First, the
probability that policies designed in period 2 are good increases as leader
r is more likely to be competent than leader l (x > xˆr). As a result, the
probability that policies are reversed decreases, which saves cost d. Second,
however, leader l cares more about a policy designed by himself than about
a policy designed by leader r, bll > b
r
l . This second effect always dominates
the first. This follows from our assumption that xbji − (1 − x)d < 0, which
guarantees that any coalition party prefers a two-party coalition to a grand
coalition.19 Hence, reversing policy yl in period 1 entails a cost for leader l
in case leader m decides to vote in favor of his own policy. With probability
(1− x)(1− w), leader m reverses ym. As a result, the opposition party is in
office for sure. If leader l reverses his policy as well, leader l and m are in
office again each with probability 1
2
, whereas leader l is certain to be in office
again if he continues his policy. Reversing yl does not affect the probability
that policies are reversed in period 2, as leader l and m are equally likely
to be competent. However, leader l values his own policies more than those
designed by leader m. Therefore, reversing yl reduces the expected benefits
19Note that we have implicitly assumed that xˆrbll − (1 − xˆr)d > 0. If this does not
hold, leader l may accept office, but he will not design and implement a policy in period
2, which yields a higher utility than the expected utility from a policy designed by leader
r in period 2.
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from policies in period 2. Concluding, irrespective of leader m’s vote on his
own policy, leader l’s expected utility from policies implemented in period 2
decreases when he reverses his policy implemented in period 1.
Third, as reversing yl reduces leader l’s chance of reelection, the expected
private rents from office decrease.
In sum, when deciding whether to reverse or continue bad policy yi, leader
i faces a trade-off between the increase in voters’ welfare in period 1 on the
one hand, and decreases in expected private rents from office and in voters’
welfare in period 2 on the other hand. Note that even whenX = 0 (no private
rents from office) politicians may be tempted to continue bad policies. This
may happen when there is strong polarization (high bii compared to b
j
i ), such
that the first term in (4) is negative. Then, all politicians, regardless of
their motivation βi, behave opportunistically so as to keep out of office rival
politicians with very different policy preferences. In what follows, we focus
on equilibria where the private rents from office as well as policy preferences
play a role. So, we assume that the first term in (4) is positive. Then,
condition (4) only holds if leader i cares sufficiently about the public interest
relative to the private rents from holding office, measured by βi.
There exists a level of βi for which condition (4) holds exactly. Denote
this threshold level by βˆ. Leaders with βi above βˆ reverse a bad policy yi,
while leaders with βi below βˆ stick to inefficient policies. Thus, βˆ can be
described as the minimum amount of public spiritedness a politician must
have so as to resist the temptation to behave opportunistically. Using (4),
we can write βˆ as:
βˆ =
£
1− 1
2
(1− x)(1− w)
¤
X
(c− d)− [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆrbii − xb
j
i − (x− xˆr)d
¤
− (1− x)(1− w)1
2
xˆr(bii − b
j
i )
(5)
Equation (5) shows how βˆ depends on the exogenous variables and on w, the
probability that other politicians behave opportunistically. Hence, there is
strategic interdependence between politicians’ actions.
Before we derive the equilibrium value of w, it is useful to first consider
the partial effect of w on βˆ, that is, how a politician’s incentive to behave
opportunistically is affected by the probability that other politicians behave
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opportunistically. Straightforward algebra yields:20
∂βˆ
∂w
=
1
2
(1− x)
£
(c− d)− (x− xˆr)
¡
b
j
i + d
¢¤
X©
(c− d)− [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆrbii − xb
j
i − (x− xˆr)d
¤
− (1− x)(1− w)1
2
xˆr(bii − b
j
i )
ª2
(6)
An increase in w affects the incentive to reverse a bad policy, and thus βˆ, for
two reasons.
First, an increase in w makes it less likely that after admitting a policy
failure incumbent i enjoys the private rents from office in period 2, see also
the numerator in equation (5). The reason is that, after admitting a policy
failure, incumbent i faces a positive probability of being in office again only
if the other incumbent also admits a policy failure. This is less likely when
w is higher. Hence, an increase in w strengthens incumbents’ incentive to
continue a bad policy, implying an increase in βˆ.
Second, an increase in w also affects the incumbent’s incentive to reverse
a bad policy through its effect on utility from policies implemented in period
2, see also the denominator in (5). This effect appears to be ambiguous.
Clearly, a sufficient condition for ∂βˆ/∂w > 0 is that the denominator of (5)
decreases with w. This requires that:£
xˆrbii − xb
j
i − (x− xˆr)d
¤
>
1
2
xˆr(bii − b
j
i ), (7)
which says that reversing a policy must have a stronger effect on incumbent
i’s utility from policies in period 2 when the other incumbent continues his
policy than when the other incumbent reverses his policy as well, see the
discussion of condition (4) above. Since, after reversing his policy, incum-
bent i is always out of office when the other incumbent continues his policy,
while he faces probability 1/2 to remain in office when the other incumbent
reverses his policy, condition (7) seems a plausible condition. Henceforth, we
focus on equilibria where this condition holds. However, when there is little
polarization in policy preferences (low bii relative to b
j
i ), or when the cost of
reversing a policy d is large, it might be that the incumbent’s incentive to
admit a policy failure is weaker rather than stronger when the probability
that other politicians admit policy failures is higher. Then, there is strategic
substitutability in politicians’ opportunism.
So far, we have treated the probability that the other leader selects the
dishonest voting strategy, w, as exogenous. Since βi is drawn from a uniform
20Recall that xˆr does not depend on w, see (2).
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distribution [0, β¯], it follows that:
w =
βˆ
β¯
, (8)
where βˆ is defined by (5). Equations (5) and (8) describe the equilibrium
values of w and βˆ in terms of the exogenous variables. We assume that β¯
is sufficiently high such that an interior solution exists, implying 0 ≤ βˆ ≤
β¯ and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. Since equation (5) is nonlinear, there need not be a
unique equilibrium. In the Appendix, we show that if ∂βˆ/∂w > 0, then a
unique equilibrium is guaranteed. In Section 4.3, we discuss the possibility
of multiple equilibria, which may arise when the distribution of politicians’
motivation is non-uniform or when β¯ is low.
Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium voting strategies of leader l and
m.
Proposition 2 Consider the vote on yl and on ym in period 1. Suppose that
the condition in Lemma 1 holds. Then leader l votes Yl when yl is good and
Nl when yl is bad if βl ≥ βˆ. If βl < βˆ, then leader l votes Yl irrespective of
the quality of yl. Similarly, leader m votes Ym when ym is good and Nm when
ym is bad if βm ≥ βˆ. If βm < βˆ then leader m votes Ym irrespective of the
quality of ym.
Proposition 2 shows that politicians who care little about the public in-
terest relative to the private rents from office-holding continue bad policies
so as to preserve their reputation as a competent policy maker and, hence,
avoid erosion of their electoral prospects. Only politicians who care suffi-
ciently about the public interest are willing to admit a policy failure at the
risk of losing the next election.
4.2 Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we examine how the exogenous variables affect the thresh-
old level βˆ and, hence, the proportion w of politicians who follow the dis-
honest strategy. As we have seen, βˆ does not only depend on the exogenous
variables, but also on w, which in turn is dependent on βˆ. Therefore, a
change in any of the exogenous variables affects βˆ directly and indirectly
through its effect on w.
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Consider the effect of an exogenous variable, say z, on w. Using (8), it
follows that by definition:
dw
dz
= (1/β¯)
dβˆ
dz
. (9)
That is, in equilibrium, it must hold that the change in w as a result of a
change in exogenous variable z equals 1/β¯ times the change in the equilibrium
value of βˆ. Using (5), the effect of a change in z on the equilibrium value of
βˆ is given by:
dβˆ
dz
=
∂βˆ
∂z
+
∂βˆ
∂w
dw
dz
, (10)
where ∂βˆ/∂w is given by (6). Combining (9) and (10) yields after some
rewriting:
dβˆ
dz
=
∂βˆ
∂z
"
1
1− (1/β¯) ∂βˆ∂w
#
. (11)
The total effect of an increase in an exogenous variable on βˆ is the product
of a direct effect, ∂βˆ/∂z, and a ‘multiplier,’ which stems from the strategic
interdependence between politicians. Note that, given that we consider an
interior solution (sufficiently high β¯), the multiplier is always positive because
∂βˆ/∂w does not exceed β¯. The multiplier magnifies the direct effect if:"
1
1− (1/β¯) ∂βˆ∂w
#
> 1 =⇒ ∂βˆ
∂w
> 0,
that is, if politicians’ opportunistic actions are strategic complements. The
reason is clear. When a change in z increases βˆ, a larger range of politicians
act opportunistically, which induces even more politicians to act opportunis-
tically. Hence, the effect of a change in any of the exogenous variables on
politicians’ incentive to behave opportunistically is magnified by strategic
complementarity in politicians’ opportunism.
Next consider the effects of the exogenous variables. Let us start with
the effect of private rents from office. Using (5), it is easy to verify that
∂βˆ/∂X is positive. The intuition is simple. As holding office becomes more
rewarding, a larger range of politicians are willing to compromise on voters’
welfare so as to increase their chance of reelection. Likewise, politicians’
incentive to behave opportunistically is stronger in more polarized political
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environments, that is, when bii increases or b
j
i decreases. The reason is that
in more polarized political environments, staying in office is more rewarding
as it keeps politicians with more differing policy preferences out of power.
It is also clear from (5) that politicians have a stronger incentive to act
opportunistically when the cost of continuing a bad policy, c, are lower, and
when the cost of reversing a policy, d, are higher.
Lastly, consider the effect of a change in the composition of the pool of
candidates from which politicians are drawn. Recall our assumption that a
politician’s βi is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, β¯]. A higher value of
β¯ implies that candidates, on average, care more about the public interest
relative to the private rents from office-holding. From (5) we can see that this
does not directly affect the threshold level βˆ. However, the threshold level is
indirectly affected as the probability that a given politician acts opportunis-
tically, w, changes. Substituting (5) into (8), and totally differentiating with
respect to w and β¯ yields after some rewriting using (8):
dw
dβ¯
= −
Ã
βˆ
β¯
2
!"
1
1− (1/β¯) ∂βˆ∂w
#
< 0. (12)
Hence, the direct effect of an increase in β¯ on w, which is −βˆ/β¯2, see (8),
is reinforced as politicians’ incentive to act opportunistically decreases when
other politicians are less likely to act opportunistically. From (5), it follows
that the effect of β¯ on the equilibrium value of βˆ is given by:
dβˆ
dβ¯
=
∂βˆ
∂w
dw
dβ¯
< 0 if
∂βˆ
∂w
> 0. (13)
Hence, when, for some exogenous reason, the composition of the pool of can-
didates changes such that politicians on average care more about the public
interest, a politician with a given βi has a weaker incentive to act opportunis-
tically. The reason is that a given reputational loss has less of an effect on
a politician’s electoral prospects in an environment where other politicians
are more likely to put at risk their reputation as well, than in an environ-
ment where politicians hardly ever admit policy failures. Similarly, entry of
politicians who care little about the public interest gives current politicians
with a given motivation a stronger incentive to behave opportunistically. A
political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing.
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4.3 Multiple Equilibria
So far, we focused on situations where a unique equilibrium arises. If β¯ is not
sufficiently high, or if we relax the assumption that politicians’ motivations
follow a uniform distribution, then multiple equilibria may arise. This is
illustrated with the help of Figure 1.
 
  
 
βˆ
w
Eq. (8) 
Eq. (5) 
0  1
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Figure 1
The convex curve starting at w = 0, βˆ > 0, represents equation (5), de-
scribing the relation between the minimum amount of public spiritedness a
politician must have so as to resist the temptation to behave opportunisti-
cally, βˆ, and the proportion of politicians expected to behave opportunisti-
cally, w. The curve is upward sloping if there is strategic complementarity in
politicians’ opportunism. In the Appendix we have shown that if the curve is
upward sloping, then it is always convex. Given that there are private rents
from office, X > 0, the curve starts at w = 0, βˆ > 0, that is, even when the
probability that other leaders behave opportunistically would be zero, some
leaders have an incentive to do so, namely the leaders with very low β. The
straight line represents equation (8), describing the uniform distribution of
politicians’ motivations.
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Clearly, with a uniform distribution, and sufficiently high maximum mo-
tivation β¯ such that when w = 1 equation (5) implies βˆ < β¯, there is a
unique equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 1 and proven in the Appendix.
Reducing the value of β¯ rotates the straight line clockwise around the origin.
For sufficiently low values of β¯, multiple equilibria arise: one unstable equi-
librium, and two stable equilibria, of which one with w < 1, and the other
with w = 1. When β¯ becomes very low, we have a unique equilibrium again,
the one where all politicians behave opportunistically, w = 1.
When the distribution of politicians’ motivations is non-uniform, equation
(8) becomes nonlinear and is no longer represented by a straight line in Figure
1. It is easy to imagine distribution functions which, together with equation
(5), imply multiple equilibria. For instance, when relatively few politicians
have ‘extreme’ motivations (β close to zero and β close to β¯), equation (5)
could be represented in Figure 1 by a curve which is concave for low values
of w and convex for high values of w. Clearly, multiple equilibria may then
arise.
5 Reputation Bashing
In the previous section, we have shown that politicians who do not care
sufficiently about the public interest continue bad policies so as to preserve
their reputation as a competent policy maker. This section extends the
analysis by allowing politicians to evaluate each other’s policy. As we will
see, this may avoid continuation of bad policies, since politicians who care
a lot about the public interest search for information and withdraw support
for a policy when they find out that it is bad. However, the opportunity to
learn about effects of a competing politician’s policy may enable politicians
who care little about the public interest to damage the reputation of their
coalition partner. Efficient policies may therefore be reversed.
As in Section 4, we assume that a leader becomes fully informed about
the quality of his own policy, and that he can not credibly transmit this
information to other leaders or voters. At a non-verifiable private cost K, a
leader also receives a fully informative, non-transmittable signal about the
quality of the other leader’s policy. The opposition leader and the voters do
not search for information.21
21Allowing the opposition party to examine the effects of the two government policies
may lead to free rider problems in information collection. Since opposition parties usually
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The timing of the events is as follows. In period 1, incumbent leader
i and j receive a private signal revealing the quality of their own policy.
Subsequently, each leader in office decides whether or not to evaluate the
policy designed by the other leader in office at non-verifiable private cost K.
Next, each leader in office decides whether to vote in favor of his own policy
and whether to support the other leader’s policy. Each leader thus selects
one out of four possible voting pairs, taking into account the information
about the quality of the two policies. The remainder of the game is the same
as in the previous section, except that also in period 2, incumbent leaders
choose whether or not to evaluate each other’s policy.
The equilibrium voting strategy and the decision on whether or not to
collect information of leader i depend again on his motivation, βi. So far, we
have assumed that βi is distributed over the interval [0, β¯]. For reasons of
tractability and to facilitate the presentation of our argument, we simplify
the model. In this section, we restrict the analysis to three types of politi-
cians: pure opportunists, moderate opportunists, and pure idealists. Below
we discuss the equilibrium strategies of the three types. A formal derivation
is given in the Appendix. We start with a description of the three types.
First, a leader who cares very little about the public interest simply max-
imizes his probability of reelection. We call such a leader a ‘pure oppor-
tunist.’ Unsurprisingly, a pure opportunist never admits a policy failure and
does not incur private cost K to become informed about the other leader’s
policy. However, a pure opportunist may vote against the policy of the other
leader, even when the expected benefits of a policy are positive. The reason
is that, in contrast to the previous section, voters take into account that a
leader may be informed about the quality of the other leader’s policy. Vot-
ing against a policy designed by the other leader may therefore increase one’s
own reelection chances. Below we show under which conditions this strategy
is an equilibrium strategy.
Second, we introduce a ‘moderate opportunist.’ Like a pure opportunist,
a moderate opportunist does not admit a policy failure and does not collect
information about the other leader’s policy. However, as he cares more about
the public interest than a pure opportunist, he supports the coalition party’s
policy, as in the previous section.
have less access to the bureaucracy, it may be more difficult for them to become informed
about the quality of government policies. Admittedly, however, it would be interesting to
extend the model so as to give the opposition party a more active role in the game. We
leave that for future research.
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Third, a leader who cares strongly about the public interest, a ‘pure
idealist,’ maximizes what he perceives as the public interest. Therefore, he
always admits a policy failure. Moreover, he evaluates the other leader’s
policy and makes sure that bad policies are reversed.
We assume that a leader is a pure opportunist with probability w1, a
moderate opportunist with probability w2, and with the remaining proba-
bility a pure idealist. The probabilities w1 and w2 are exogenous. In the
Appendix, we derive the range of values that β can take for each type, given
the equilibrium strategies of the other types.22
Period 2 In period 2, the results are the same as in Section 4: good policies
are continued, whereas bad policies are reversed. As there are no reelection
concerns in period 2, any type of leader admits a policy failure. Consequently,
there is no use in evaluating each other’s policy in period 2.
Elections and government formation Since there is no moral hazard
problem in period 2, swing voters base their vote only on their beliefs about
the competence of the leaders. The following Lemma describes the voting
decision of the swing voters.
Lemma 2 Suppose leader i and j are in office in period 1. Then:
a) The opposition leader wins the elections if leader i or if leader j, or
both, vote (Ni, Nj).
b) Leader i wins the elections if leader j votes (Yi, Nj).
c) With equal probability, leader i or leader j wins the elections if both
leader i and j vote (Yi, Yj) and if leader i votes (Yi, Nj) and leader j
votes (Ni, Yj).
d) Lastly, when leader i votes (Yi, Nj) and leader j votes (Yi, Yj), leader i
wins the elections if the following condition holds:
w2(1− w2)x (xˆg − xˆi + x− xˆr) ≥
w2w1 [2x(xˆ
g − xˆi + x− xˆr) + xˆi − x] + w1w1x (x− xˆr) ,
22A more extensive treatment would allow for other types as well. For instance, there
may exist a type who only admits a policy failure after finding out that the other leader’s
policy is also a failure. We conjecture that our main result in this section is not affected
by allowing for more types as long as the group of pure idealists is sufficiently large.
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where xˆi ∈ (x, xˆg). If this condition does not hold, an equilibrium in
mixed strategies exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us discuss the four cases described by Lemma 2 in detail. In case a)
and in case b), at least one leader votes against his own policy. As only a
pure idealist admits a policy failure, this vote reveals his type. Recall that a
pure idealist is informed about the quality of both policies and votes in favor
of a policy only if it is good. Hence, swing voters learn the quality of both
policies and select the opposition leader in case a) and leader i in case b).
In case a), the opposition leader forms a coalition government with leader
i or j with equal probability, since leader i and j are equally likely to be
competent. In case b), leader i forms a coalition with the opposition party,
since x > xˆr.
Swing voters can not discriminate between the two leaders in office when
both leaders vote in favor of both policies, and when both leaders vote in
favor of their own policy and against the other policy (case c)). Selecting
the opposition party is then never optimal as the opposition leader can also
not discriminate between leader i and j. If the opposition leader wins the
elections, he randomizes between leader i and j when he selects the coalition
partner for period 2. Voters can improve upon the selection of politicians by
electing either leader i or j. The reason is that leader i and/or j may be an
idealist and, hence, may be informed about the quality of policies in period
1. Then, leader i or j is better able to select a competent coalition partner
than the opposition leader.23
Finally, in case d) one leader in office votes in favor of both policies
whereas the other leader in office votes in favor of his own policy and against
the other policy. The latter leader is either a pure idealist or a pure oppor-
tunist. A pure idealist i votes against yj only if yj is bad. On the contrary,
a pure opportunist i may only vote against yj so as to increase his reelec-
tion chances. Voters prefer leader i to win the elections only if leader i is
sufficiently more likely to be an informed pure idealist than to be a pure
23In case c), the coalition in period 2 consists of leader i and j if both leaders have voted
(Yi, Yj). If leader i voted (Yi, Nj) and leader j voted (Ni, Yj), the winner of the elections
(i or j) forms a coalition with the opposition party if the winner is a pure idealist (and
hence knows that the other leader did not admit a policy failure in period 1). If the winner
is a pure opportunist, the coalition in period 2 consists of leader i and j. The same holds
in case d).
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opportunist. The condition in Lemma 2 therefore only holds if w1 is not
too large. The condition always hold if neither leader is a pure opportunist
(w1 = 0). Then leader i is a pure idealist for sure, whereas leader j is identi-
fied as a moderate opportunist. Swing voters trust a pure idealist and select
leader i. On the contrary, the condition is violated if leader i is very likely to
be a pure opportunist (w1 close to 1). Then, only an equilibrium in mixed
strategies exists, which will be discussed below.
Period 1 Let us now consider the implications of swing voters’ behavior
for the incumbents’ decisions in period 1. In period 1, each coalition leader
decides whether or not to become informed about the quality of the other
leader’s policy. Next, the leaders make a decision whether to vote in favor
or against yi and yj. Proposition 3 summarizes the voting decision of each
type of leader.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the opposition leader votes (Ni, Nj). Suppose
only pure idealists collect information about the quality of other leader’s pol-
icy. Then, a pure idealist i votes Yi if and only if yi is good and votes Yj if
and only if yj is good. A moderate opportunist i votes (Yi, Yj) irrespective of
the quality of yi. A pure opportunist i votes (Yi, Yj) if yi is good, and votes
(Yi, Nj) if yi is bad and the condition in Lemma 2 holds. When the condition
in Lemma 2 does not hold, a pure opportunist i votes (Yi, Yj) if yi is good
and mixes between (Yi, Yj) and (Yi, Nj) if yi is bad.
Above, we already discussed the voting behavior of pure idealists and of
moderate opportunists. A pure opportunist i always votes for his own policy.
His vote on the other leader’s policy yj depends on the quality of his own
policy yi. When his own policy turned out to be good, leader i votes for
the other leader’s policy. The reason is that, given that yi is good, he stays
in office for sure as he is either the winner of the elections or afterwards
selected as a coalition party (see the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
Hence, there is no reason to vote against yj. However, if yi is bad, leader i’s
reelection is uncertain. Voting against yj then increases leader i’s reelection
chances as this harms the reputation of the other incumbent leader, given
that the other leader votes in favor of his policy. When leader j votes (Yi, Yj),
and the condition in Lemma 2 holds, a pure opportunist i is sure to win the
elections when he votes (Yi, Nj), see case d) in Lemma 2. When leader j votes
(Ni, Yj), a pure opportunist i wins the elections with probability 1/2 when
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he votes against yj (see case c)) whereas he loses the elections when he votes
in favor of the other leader’s policy. Since pure opportunists maximize their
probability of reelection, they vote against the other leader’s policy when
their own policy turned out to be bad. As a result, efficient policies may be
reversed.
It is easy to show that an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist
if the condition in Lemma 2 is violated. Suppose swing voters believe that
a pure opportunist i always votes (Yi, Nj) when his policy is bad. Then, a
leader j who votes (Yi, Yj) wins the elections if leader i votes (Yi, Nj), given
that the condition in Lemma 2 is violated. Clearly, given the swing voters’
beliefs, pure opportunists have an incentive to vote (Yi, Yj). Suppose swing
voters believe that a pure opportunist i always votes (Yi, Yj). Then, swing
voters vote for leader i when he votes (Yi, Nj) since only a pure idealist i may
vote against yj. Given these swing voters’ beliefs, a pure opportunist i has an
incentive to vote (Yi, Nj) when his policy is bad. Clearly, only an equilibrium
in mixed strategies exists when the condition in Lemma 2 is violated. A pure
opportunist votes with a probability against the other leader’s policy when
his own policy turned out to be bad. Swing voters select leader i with a
probability when leader i votes (Yi, Nj) and leader j votes (Yi, Yj), and select
leader j with the remaining probability. Also in this case, efficient policies
may be reversed.24
Decision to collect information Lastly, consider leaders’ incentive to
collect information about the quality of each other’s policy. For sufficiently
high K, opportunists do not incur private cost K since they do not care
sufficiently about the public interest. Consider pure idealists’ incentive to
collect information. Suppose leader i received a signal that his own policy
yi is good. Given the equilibrium voting strategies described above, leader i
decides to evaluate yj if:
βi(1− x)
·
(w1 + w2)(c− d) + (
1
2
w1 + w2)
1
2
b
j
i (x− xˆr)
¸
≥ K. (14)
Clearly, a pure idealist only has an incentive to collect information if there
is a probability that the other leader does not admit a policy failure (w1 6= 0
and/or w2 6= 0). When the other leader does not admit a policy failure,
24Likewise, only an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists when we consider a two-type
model with only pure idealists and pure opportunists.
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information collection raises utility from policies in period 1 with c− d, and
improves upon the selection of competent politicians for office in period 2.
These benefits and βi must be sufficiently high to make up for the cost of
information collection,K. When leader i received a signal that his own policy
yi is bad, he decides to evaluate yj if:
βi(1−x)
·
(w1 + w2)(c− d) + (w1 + w2)
1
2
xˆr(bii − b
j
i )
¸
+
1
2
(1−x)(w1+w2)X ≥ K
(15)
Like above, evaluation may prevent the cost of continuing a bad policy. How-
ever, evaluation affects the selection of period 2 politicians differently than
when yi is good. As leader i is an idealist, he admits that yi is bad. If he
decides not to evaluate the other leader’s policy, leader i faces a probabil-
ity of reelection only if leader j is an idealist as well and yj is bad. When
leader j is an opportunist, leader i can increase his probability of reelection
by finding out that yj is bad. Then, leader i is reelected with probability
1/2 since leader i and j look equally (in)competent in the eyes of the voters
when leader i votes (Ni, Nj). Hence, when a pure idealist’s policy turned out
to be a failure, electoral concerns may give him an additional incentive to
evaluate the other leader’s policy, as it increases the probability of receiving
the private rents from office X in period 2.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have studied politicians’ incentive to behave opportunistically for reelec-
tion purposes. A key element of our model is that politicians do not only
differ in competence and policy preferences, but also differ in their intrin-
sic motivation to improve upon the well-being of citizens. We have focused
on an agency problem that arises when voters are less informed about the
effects of policies than politicians are. We have shown that a higher re-
ward from holding office and increased polarization in the policy positions
strengthen the politicians’ incentive to behave opportunistically. When sev-
eral politicians are involved in decision making, these effects are magnified
by a strategic complementarity in politicians’ opportunism. We have shown
that politicians have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if they
believe other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A po-
litical culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may
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arise. Lastly, we have shown that efficient policies may be reversed by op-
portunistic politicians so as to damage the reputation of their competitors.
This may happen when politicians may be informed about the effects of each
other’s policies, and there is a sufficiently large number of publicly spirited
politicians among the pool of candidates. Public spiritedness among politi-
cians lends some credibility to a politician’s claim that his competitor’s policy
is a failure. Opportunistic politicians take advantage of this and may vote
against efficient policies designed by other politicians.
A particularly interesting extension of the model would be to endogenize
politicians’ participation decision, as in Caselli and Morelli (2004), Besley
(2003), and other recent papers. While a higher reward from holding office
may encourage people with high ability, or with high moral cost of taking
bribes, to strive for a political career, it may also attract people who care
most about the rewards from office, not about society. This, in turn, may
strengthen the incentive of the politicians that already participated to behave
opportunistically as a result of the strategic complementarity in politicians’
opportunism. Other interesting extensions include examining endogenous
removal of a party’s leader by party members, the endogenous determina-
tion of politicians’ pay, and information provision to voters by media and
‘independent’ agencies.
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Appendix
Proof of unique equilibrium if ∂βˆ/∂w > 0
First note that equation (8) can be written as βˆ = β¯w: a linear relation
with slope β¯, with minimum 0 when w = 0 and maximum β¯ when w = 1.
Next consider equation (5). Denote the function on the right-hand side by
βˆ(w). When w = 0, it follows that βˆ(0) > 0 given that X > 0. In the
main text, we showed that, under a plausible condition, βˆ
0
(w) is positive. To
ensure that at least one interior solution exists, it is sufficient to assume that
β¯ is sufficiently high such that βˆ(1) < β¯. The second derivative reads:
∂2βˆ
∂w2
=
µ
(1− x)2
©
(c− d) +
£
xˆrbii − xb
j
i − (x− xˆr)d
¤
− xˆr(bii − b
j
i )
ª×
×©£xˆrbii − xbji − (x− xˆr)d¤− 12 xˆr(bii − bji )ªX
¶
©
(c− d)− [x+ (1− x)w]
£
xˆrbii − xb
j
i − (x− xˆr)d
¤
− (1− x)(1− w)1
2
xˆr(bii − b
j
i )
ª3
(16)
By comparing (6) with (16), and using (7), it is easy to verify that if βˆ
0
(w) >
0, then βˆ
00
(w) > 0 for any 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. Hence, βˆ(w) is convex and increasing.
Since (8) is linear, it follows that a unique equilibrium is guaranteed, see also
Figure 1 in Section 4.3.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Swing voters strategies in the three-types
case
The results of cases a), b), and c) follow directly from the intuition in
the main text. Consider case d). Suppose leader i votes (Yi, Nj) and leader
j votes (Yi, Yj). Given the equilibrium strategies of each type as defined in
Proposition 3, voters infer three possible combinations of types; 1) leader i
is a pure idealist, leader j is a moderate opportunist, 2) leader i is a pure
opportunist, leader j is a moderate opportunist, and 3) both leader i and j
are pure opportunists. Swing voters maximize the expected quality of period
2 policies. As discussed in the main text, selecting the opposition leader is
not optimal as the opposition leader is equally informed as the voters about
the competence of the incumbents. Swing voters vote for leader i rather than
leader j if:
w2(1− w1 − w2)x(1− x) (xˆg + x) + w2w1(1− x) (xˆr + x) + w1w1x(1− x) (xˆr + xˆg) ≥
w2(1− w1 − w2)x(1− x) (xˆr + xˆi) + w2w1(1− x) [x (xˆg + x) + (1− x)(xˆr + xˆi)]
+w1w1x(1− x) (xˆg + x)
After some straightforward algebra, the condition in Lemma 2 follows from
the above condition. Note that when leader j wins the elections and leader j
is a moderate opportunist, then he selects leader i if yj is bad and he select
the opposition leader if yj is good. In the latter case, leader j infers from the
vote of leader i that leader i is a pure opportunist and yi is bad. When yj is
bad, leader j can not fully infer the type of leader i. Either leader i is a pure
idealist and yi is good or he is pure opportunist and yi is bad. The posterior
probability that leader i designs a good policy in period 2 then is:
xˆi =
·
(1− w1 − w2)x
(1− w1 − w2)x+ w1(1− x)
¸
xˆg +
·
w1(1− x)
(1− w1 − w2)x+ w1(1− x)
¸
xˆr
Note that xˆi < xˆg. If (1 − w1 − w2)x(xˆg − x) > w1(1 − x)(x − xˆr), then
xˆi > x and leader j selects leader i. Otherwise, leader j selects the opposition
leader when his own policy is bad. Then, the condition in Lemma 2 becomes
w2(1−w2)x (xˆg − xˆr) ≥ w2w12x(xˆg − xˆr) +w1w1x (x− xˆr). The intuition is
the same as in the main text.
Definition of a pure idealist
A pure idealist evaluates yj and votes in line with the public interest.
This requires that condition (14) and (15) are satisfied, which is the case for
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sufficiently high βi. Given that a pure idealist i is informed about yj he votes
Yi if and only if yi is good and votes Yj if and only if yj is good.
Suppose yi is good. Clearly, leader i votes Yi. Furthermore, as leader i is
in office for sure he votes Yj if yj is good and votes Nj if yj is bad.
Suppose yi is bad and yj is good. Then a pure idealist prefers (Ni, Yj)
over all other voting strategies. First, a pure idealist i votes (Ni, Yj) rather
than (Ni, Nj) if:
βi
·¡
b
j
i + d
¢
+
1
2
(xˆgbji − xˆrbii) +
1
2
(xˆg − xˆr) d
¸
− (1− w1 − w2)
1
2
X ≥ 0
Second, a pure idealist i votes (Ni, Yj) rather than (Yi, Nj) if:
βi
½
(bji + d) + (w2 + w1)(c− d)−
·
w1 + w2 +
1
2
(1− w1 − w2)
¸ £
(xˆrbii − xb
j
i )− (x− xˆr)d
¤¾
−
·
w1 + w2 +
1
2
(1− w1 − w2)
¸
X ≥ 0
Third, a pure idealist i votes (Ni, Yj) rather than (Yi, Yj) if:
βi
©
(1− w1 − w2)(c− d)− (w1 + w2)
£
(xˆrbii − xb
j
i )− (x− xˆr)d
¤ª
−(w1+w2)X ≥ 0
All three conditions require that βi is sufficiently high compared to the de-
crease in expected rents from office.
Suppose yi is bad and yj is bad. Then a pure idealist votes (Ni, Nj) rather
than (Yi, Nj) if:
βi
½
w2(c− d)− w1
1
2
£
(xˆrbii − xb
j
i )− (x− xˆr)d
¤
− w2
1
2
(xˆrbii − xˆrb
j
i )
¾
−1
2
(w1+w2)X ≥ 0
which also hold if a pure idealist cares sufficiently about social welfare.
Definition of a moderate opportunist
We assumed that a moderate opportunist i decides to remain uninformed
about the quality of yj. When yi is good this requires that the level of βi is
such that condition (14) is violated. When yi is bad, a moderate opportunist
decides to remain uninformed if:
βi
·
(1− x)(w1 + w2)(c− d) + (1− x)(w1
1
2
+ w2)b
j
i (x− xˆr)
¸
< K.
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This requires that a moderate opportunist does not care too much about
social welfare. Given that a moderate opportunist i decides to remain unin-
formed he votes (Yi, Yj). When yi is good this is always an optimal strategy.
The reason is that leader i is in office for sure if yi is good and the expected
benefits of policy yj are positive (see Lemma 1).
Suppose yi is bad. Then a moderate opportunist votes (Yi, Yj) rather
than (Ni, Nj) if:
βi



x(bji + d)− (1− x)(w1 + w2)(c− d)
+x
£
(1
2
xˆgb
j
i +
1
2
xˆrbii − xb
j
i ) + (
1
2
xˆg + 1
2
xˆr − x)d
¤
+(1− x)(w1 + w2)
£
(1
2
xˆrbji +
1
2
xˆrbii − xb
j
i )− (x− xˆr)d
¤



+
·
w1 + w2 −
1
2
x(1− w1 − w2)
¸
X ≥ 0
If the term within the curly brackets is positive the condition always hold.
Otherwise, βi should not be too high.
Second, a moderate opportunist i votes (Yi, Yj) rather than (Yi, Nj) if:
βi
½£
x(bji + d)− (1− x)(w1 + w2)(c− d)
¤
− x(1− w1 − w2)
1
2
£¡
xˆrbii − xb
j
i
¢
− (x− xˆr)d
¤¾
−
·
1
2
(1− w1 − w2)x
¸
X ≥ 0
which requires that a moderate opportunist cares sufficiently about the other
policy and βi is sufficiently high.
Finally, a moderate opportunist votes (Yi, Yj) rather than (Ni, Yj) if:
βi
©
(w1x+ w2)(c− d) + (w1 + w2)
£
(xbji − xˆrbii) + (x− xˆr)d
¤ª
−(w1 + w2)X ≤ 0
which is satisfied if βi is sufficiently low.
Definition of a pure opportunist
Recall that a pure opportunist i decides to remain uninformed about the
quality of yj. This requires that βi is sufficiently low such that condition (14)
is violated for a pure opportunist when yi is good. When yi is bad, a pure
opportunist maximizes his probability of reelection by voting (Yi, Nj) both
if he is informed and if he is uninformed. As the voting strategies are the
same, there is no reason to incur cost K to become informed.
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Given that a pure opportunist remains uninformed, he votes (Yi, Yj) if
yi is good. This is optimal as leader i is in office for sure and the expected
benefits of yj are positive. Furthermore, a pure opportunist i votes (Yi, Nj)
if yi is bad. A pure opportunist i votes (Yi, Nj) rather than (Ni, Nj) if:
βi
½
−(w2 + xw1)(c− d) + x(1− w1 − w2)12
£¡
xˆgbji − xb
j
i
¢
+ (xˆg − x)d
¤
+(w1 + w2)
£
(1
2
xˆrb
j
i +
1
2
xˆrbii − xb
j
i )− (x− xˆr)d
¤ ¾
+(w1 + w2)X ≥ 0.
Second, a pure opportunist i votes (Yi, Nj) rather than (Yi, Yj) if:
βi
½
−x(bji + d) + (1− x)(w1 + w2)(c− d) + x(1− w1 − w2)
1
2
£¡
xˆrbii − xb
j
i
¢
− (x− xˆr)d
¤¾
+
·
1
2
(1− w1 − w2)x
¸
X ≥ 0
Finally, a pure opportunist i votes (Yi, Nj) rather than (Ni, Yj) if:
βi
½
−x(bji + d)− [x(w1 + w2)− (1− x)w1] (c− d)
−
£
w1 + w2 +
1
2
x(1− w1 − w2)
¤ £¡
xˆrbii − xb
j
i
¢
− (x− xˆr)d
¤ ¾
+
·
w1 + w2 +
1
2
x(1− w1 − w2)
¸
X ≥ 0
All three conditions are satisfied if βi is sufficiently close to zero.
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Notation
i ∈ {l,m, r} a leader attached to party I
yi policy designed by leader i in office
α prior belief that a leader is competent
x prior probability that a leader designs a good policy
αˆv where v ∈ {c, r}, voters’ posterior belief that a leader is competent
when he voted for his policy in period 1 (c), or against (r).
αˆp where p ∈ {g, b}, a leader’s posterior belief that he is competent
when he has observed that his policy in period 1 is good (g), bad (b)
xˆv voters’ posterior probability that leader i designs a good policy in period 2
xˆp leader i’s posterior probability that he designs a good policy in period 2
bii increase in social welfare according to leader i if a good policy yi is continued
b
j
i increase in social welfare according to leader i if a good policy yj is continued
c decrease in social welfare when a bad policy is continued
d decrease in social welfare when a policy is reversed
βi ∈ [0, β¯] value attached to social welfare by leader i
X private rents from being in office in a period
w probability that an incumbent plays the dishonest voting strategy (Section 4)
w1, w2 probability that a leader is a ‘pure opportunist’, ‘moderate opportunist’
(Section 5)
K private cost of acquiring information about the other leader’s policy
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